arcana/ecc/x448.rs
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2// Copyright 2026 Cédric Mesnil <cslashm@pm.me>
3
4//! X448 Diffie-Hellman key agreement on Curve448 (RFC 7748).
5//!
6//! X448 is the 448-bit sibling of [`super::x25519`]: same Montgomery-
7//! ladder structure, different field prime (`p = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1`),
8//! different base-point u-coordinate (`5` instead of `9`), different
9//! scalar clamping, and 56-byte little-endian encoding throughout
10//! (not 32). It is the ECDH half of the RFC 8032 "Ed448 / X448" pair
11//! and the higher-security tier of the Curve25519 / Curve448 family
12//! used in TLS 1.3, Noise, and Signal's future-proofing profiles.
13//!
14//! # Side-channel posture
15//!
16//! Same plan as `super::x25519`
17//! (see `arcana/doc/sca/countermeasures/x25519_x448.rst`):
18//! `T1-G` audit pass, `T2-A` Z-rerandomization on `(X : Z)`, `T2-B`
19//! scalar blinding. The implementation route is identical mutatis
20//! mutandis on Curve448; the field arithmetic shares
21//! [`super::field`]'s `black_box`-shielded mask selects.
22//!
23//! # Constants (RFC 7748 §4.2)
24//!
25//! | Parameter | Value |
26//! |----------------|------------------------------------------------|
27//! | p | `2^448 - 2^224 - 1` |
28//! | A | `156326` |
29//! | a24 | `(A - 2) / 4 = 39081` |
30//! | Base u | `5` |
31//! | Scalar bits | 448 (clamping sets bit 447, clears low 2 bits) |
32//!
33//! # API
34//!
35//! Mirror of the X25519 API with 56-byte arrays:
36//!
37//! ```rust,ignore
38//! use arcana::ecc::x448::{x448_derive_public, x448_ecdh};
39//!
40//! let alice_sk: [u8; 56] = /* rng */;
41//! let bob_sk: [u8; 56] = /* rng */;
42//!
43//! let alice_pk = x448_derive_public(&alice_sk);
44//! let bob_pk = x448_derive_public(&bob_sk);
45//!
46//! let s_ab = x448_ecdh(&alice_sk, &bob_pk);
47//! let s_ba = x448_ecdh(&bob_sk, &alice_pk);
48//! assert_eq!(s_ab, s_ba);
49//! ```
50//!
51//! # Test vectors
52//!
53//! The tests at the bottom of this file pin the two primitive vectors
54//! from RFC 7748 §5.2 and the full Diffie-Hellman vector from §6.2
55//! byte-exact. Together they exercise ladder, clamping, and LE
56//! encoding against the spec.
57
58use super::field::*;
59
60// ============================================================================
61// Curve constants (RFC 7748 §4.2)
62// ============================================================================
63
64/// `a24 = (156326 - 2) / 4 = 39081`.
65fn a24() -> FieldElement<7> {
66 let mut fe = FieldElement::<7>::ZERO;
67 fe.limbs[0] = 39_081;
68 fe
69}
70
71/// Curve448 base point u-coordinate = 5 (RFC 7748 §4.2).
72const BASE_U: [u8; 56] = {
73 let mut b = [0u8; 56];
74 b[0] = 5;
75 b
76};
77
78// ============================================================================
79// Scalar clamping + u-coordinate decoding (RFC 7748 §5)
80// ============================================================================
81
82/// RFC 7748 §5 `decodeScalar448`: force the scalar into the range
83/// `[2^447, 2^448)` and a multiple of 4.
84///
85/// - Clear the 2 low bits of byte 0 (multiple of 4)
86/// - Set the top bit of byte 55 (bit 447 of the 448-bit LE integer)
87///
88/// Note: unlike X25519 there is no "clear bit 255" step because 448
89/// is already byte-aligned.
90fn decode_scalar(scalar: &[u8; 56]) -> [u8; 56] {
91 let mut k = *scalar;
92 k[0] &= 252; // 0b11111100
93 k[55] |= 128; // 0b10000000
94 k
95}
96
97/// RFC 7748 §5 `decodeUCoordinate` for Curve448.
98///
99/// Unlike Curve25519, Curve448's u is decoded as a plain little-endian
100/// integer in `Fp` with no high-bit masking: 448 is already a multiple
101/// of 8, so the RFC's "clear the high bits above (qlen mod 8)" step
102/// is a no-op.
103fn decode_u(u: &[u8; 56]) -> FieldElement<7> {
104 FieldElement::<7>::from_bytes_le(u)
105}
106
107/// Encode a field element as 56 little-endian bytes.
108fn encode_u(fe: &FieldElement<7>) -> [u8; 56] {
109 let v = fe.to_bytes_le();
110 let mut out = [0u8; 56];
111 out.copy_from_slice(&v);
112 out
113}
114
115// ============================================================================
116// Constant-time conditional swap of two field elements
117// ============================================================================
118
119/// Constant-time swap of `a` and `b` iff `swap == 1`.
120///
121/// Same structure as the X25519 helper but sized for LIMBS=7 instead
122/// of 4. `swap` must be 0 or 1.
123fn ct_swap_fe(a: &mut FieldElement<7>, b: &mut FieldElement<7>, swap: u64) {
124 let mask = 0u64.wrapping_sub(swap);
125 for i in 0..7 {
126 let t = mask & (a.limbs[i] ^ b.limbs[i]);
127 a.limbs[i] ^= t;
128 b.limbs[i] ^= t;
129 }
130}
131
132// ============================================================================
133// The X448 primitive — RFC 7748 §5, Montgomery ladder on (X:Z)
134// ============================================================================
135
136/// RFC 7748 §5 `X448(scalar, u)`.
137///
138/// Takes a 56-byte little-endian scalar and a 56-byte little-endian
139/// u-coordinate, and returns the 56-byte little-endian u-coordinate
140/// of `scalar * (u, v)` on Curve448.
141///
142/// The ladder runs 448 iterations (bits 447..0 of the clamped
143/// scalar); the clamp sets bit 447 unconditionally, so the first
144/// cswap initializes (x_2, x_3) = (u, 1), (z_2, z_3) = (1, u).
145pub fn x448(scalar: &[u8; 56], u: &[u8; 56]) -> [u8; 56] {
146 let k = decode_scalar(scalar);
147 let x1 = decode_u(u);
148 let a24 = a24();
149 let p = &CURVE448_P;
150
151 // Ladder state: x_2 = 1, z_2 = 0, x_3 = x1, z_3 = 1.
152 let mut x_2 = FieldElement::<7>::one();
153 let mut z_2 = FieldElement::<7>::ZERO;
154 let mut x_3 = x1;
155 let mut z_3 = FieldElement::<7>::one();
156
157 let mut swap: u64 = 0;
158
159 for t in (0..=447).rev() {
160 let k_t = ((k[t >> 3] >> (t & 7)) & 1) as u64;
161 swap ^= k_t;
162 ct_swap_fe(&mut x_2, &mut x_3, swap);
163 ct_swap_fe(&mut z_2, &mut z_3, swap);
164 swap = k_t;
165
166 // RFC 7748 §5 ladder step (same for Curve25519 and Curve448,
167 // only a24 and the field prime differ):
168 //
169 // A = x_2 + z_2
170 // AA = A^2
171 // B = x_2 - z_2
172 // BB = B^2
173 // E = AA - BB
174 // C = x_3 + z_3
175 // D = x_3 - z_3
176 // DA = D * A
177 // CB = C * B
178 // x_3 = (DA + CB)^2
179 // z_3 = x_1 * (DA - CB)^2
180 // x_2 = AA * BB
181 // z_2 = E * (AA + a24 * E)
182 let a = field_add(&x_2, &z_2, p);
183 let aa = field_sqr(&a, p);
184 let b = field_sub(&x_2, &z_2, p);
185 let bb = field_sqr(&b, p);
186 let e = field_sub(&aa, &bb, p);
187 let c = field_add(&x_3, &z_3, p);
188 let d = field_sub(&x_3, &z_3, p);
189 let da = field_mul(&d, &a, p);
190 let cb = field_mul(&c, &b, p);
191
192 let da_plus_cb = field_add(&da, &cb, p);
193 x_3 = field_sqr(&da_plus_cb, p);
194
195 let da_minus_cb = field_sub(&da, &cb, p);
196 let da_minus_cb_sq = field_sqr(&da_minus_cb, p);
197 z_3 = field_mul(&x1, &da_minus_cb_sq, p);
198
199 x_2 = field_mul(&aa, &bb, p);
200
201 let a24_e = field_mul(&a24, &e, p);
202 let aa_plus_a24e = field_add(&aa, &a24_e, p);
203 z_2 = field_mul(&e, &aa_plus_a24e, p);
204 }
205
206 // Final unmasking swap.
207 ct_swap_fe(&mut x_2, &mut x_3, swap);
208 ct_swap_fe(&mut z_2, &mut z_3, swap);
209
210 // Return x_2 / z_2 = x_2 * z_2^{p-2} mod p as 56 LE bytes.
211 let z_inv = field_inv(&z_2, p);
212 let result = field_mul(&x_2, &z_inv, p);
213 encode_u(&result)
214}
215
216// ============================================================================
217// Public API — keygen + ECDH convenience wrappers
218// ============================================================================
219
220/// Derive the X448 public key from a 56-byte secret key.
221///
222/// Equivalent to `x448(sk, 5)` per RFC 7748 §5.
223pub fn x448_derive_public(sk: &[u8; 56]) -> [u8; 56] {
224 x448(sk, &BASE_U)
225}
226
227/// X448 Diffie-Hellman: derive a shared secret from our secret key
228/// and the peer's public key.
229///
230/// Returns the 56-byte u-coordinate of `sk * peer_pk`. As with X25519,
231/// this is the raw SP 800-56A "Z" value; callers feed it into a KDF
232/// of their choice before using it for symmetric keying. See the
233/// analogous doc in [`super::x25519`] for the low-order defensive
234/// check rationale.
235pub fn x448_ecdh(sk: &[u8; 56], peer_pk: &[u8; 56]) -> [u8; 56] {
236 x448(sk, peer_pk)
237}
238
239// ============================================================================
240// Tests (RFC 7748 pinned vectors)
241// ============================================================================
242
243#[cfg(test)]
244mod tests {
245 use super::*;
246
247 fn hex56(h: &str) -> [u8; 56] {
248 assert_eq!(h.len(), 112);
249 let mut out = [0u8; 56];
250 for i in 0..56 {
251 out[i] = u8::from_str_radix(&h[2 * i..2 * i + 2], 16).unwrap();
252 }
253 out
254 }
255
256 // ----- RFC 7748 §5.2 primitive test vector #1 -----
257 //
258 // Scalar:
259 // 3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae12170
260 // 0a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3
261 // u-coordinate:
262 // 06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f981
263 // 4dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086
264 // X448(k, u):
265 // ce3e4ff95a60dc6697da1db1d85e6afbdf79b50a2412d7546d5f239fe1
266 // 4fbaadeb445fc66a01b0779d98223961111e21766282f73dd96b6f
267 #[test]
268 fn rfc7748_section_5_2_vector_1() {
269 let scalar = hex56(
270 "3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae121700a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3",
271 );
272 let u = hex56(
273 "06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f9814dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086",
274 );
275 let expected = hex56(
276 "ce3e4ff95a60dc6697da1db1d85e6afbdf79b50a2412d7546d5f239fe14fbaadeb445fc66a01b0779d98223961111e21766282f73dd96b6f",
277 );
278 assert_eq!(x448(&scalar, &u), expected);
279 }
280
281 // ----- RFC 7748 §5.2 primitive test vector #2 -----
282 #[test]
283 fn rfc7748_section_5_2_vector_2() {
284 let scalar = hex56(
285 "203d494428b8399352665ddca42f9de8fef600908e0d461cb021f8c538345dd77c3e4806e25f46d3315c44e0a5b4371282dd2c8d5be3095f",
286 );
287 let u = hex56(
288 "0fbcc2f993cd56d3305b0b7d9e55d4c1a8fb5dbb52f8e9a1e9b6201b165d015894e56c4d3570bee52fe205e28a78b91cdfbde71ce8d157db",
289 );
290 let expected = hex56(
291 "884a02576239ff7a2f2f63b2db6a9ff37047ac13568e1e30fe63c4a7ad1b3ee3a5700df34321d62077e63633c575c1c954514e99da7c179d",
292 );
293 assert_eq!(x448(&scalar, &u), expected);
294 }
295
296 // ----- RFC 7748 §6.2 full Diffie-Hellman test vector -----
297 //
298 // Alice's private key: 9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28d
299 // d9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b
300 // Alice's public key: 9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c
301 // 22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0
302 // Bob's private key: 1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d
303 // 6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d
304 // Bob's public key: 3eb7a829b0cd20f5bcfc0b599b6feccf6da4627107bdb0d4f345b430
305 // 27d8b972fc3e34fb4232a13ca706dcb57aec3dae07bdc1c67bf33609
306 // Shared secret K: 07fff4181ac6cc95ec1c16a94a0f74d12da232ce40a77552281d282b
307 // b60c0b56fd2464c335543936521c24403085d59a449a5037514a879d
308 #[test]
309 fn rfc7748_section_6_2_alice_pk() {
310 let alice_sk = hex56(
311 "9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b",
312 );
313 let expected = hex56(
314 "9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0",
315 );
316 assert_eq!(x448_derive_public(&alice_sk), expected);
317 }
318
319 #[test]
320 fn rfc7748_section_6_2_bob_pk() {
321 let bob_sk = hex56(
322 "1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d",
323 );
324 let expected = hex56(
325 "3eb7a829b0cd20f5bcfc0b599b6feccf6da4627107bdb0d4f345b43027d8b972fc3e34fb4232a13ca706dcb57aec3dae07bdc1c67bf33609",
326 );
327 assert_eq!(x448_derive_public(&bob_sk), expected);
328 }
329
330 #[test]
331 fn rfc7748_section_6_2_shared_secret() {
332 let alice_sk = hex56(
333 "9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b",
334 );
335 let bob_sk = hex56(
336 "1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d",
337 );
338 let alice_pk = x448_derive_public(&alice_sk);
339 let bob_pk = x448_derive_public(&bob_sk);
340 let expected = hex56(
341 "07fff4181ac6cc95ec1c16a94a0f74d12da232ce40a77552281d282bb60c0b56fd2464c335543936521c24403085d59a449a5037514a879d",
342 );
343 assert_eq!(x448_ecdh(&alice_sk, &bob_pk), expected);
344 assert_eq!(x448_ecdh(&bob_sk, &alice_pk), expected);
345 }
346
347 // ----- Round-trip on arbitrary keys -----
348 #[test]
349 fn x448_roundtrip_custom_keys() {
350 let alice_sk = hex56(
351 "0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
352 );
353 let bob_sk = hex56(
354 "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202",
355 );
356 let alice_pk = x448_derive_public(&alice_sk);
357 let bob_pk = x448_derive_public(&bob_sk);
358 let s_ab = x448_ecdh(&alice_sk, &bob_pk);
359 let s_ba = x448_ecdh(&bob_sk, &alice_pk);
360 assert_eq!(s_ab, s_ba);
361 assert!(s_ab.iter().any(|&b| b != 0));
362 }
363
364 // ----- Clamping idempotence -----
365 //
366 // Forcing the low 2 bits of byte 0 and the top bit of byte 55 to
367 // "dirty" values must not change the output, because `decode_scalar`
368 // overrides them unconditionally.
369 #[test]
370 fn clamping_is_idempotent() {
371 let base = hex56(
372 "3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae121700a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3",
373 );
374 let u = hex56(
375 "06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f9814dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086",
376 );
377 let ref_out = x448(&base, &u);
378
379 let mut dirty = base;
380 dirty[0] |= 0b0000_0011; // low 2 bits (cleared by clamp)
381 dirty[55] &= !0b1000_0000; // top bit (set by clamp)
382 let dirty_out = x448(&dirty, &u);
383 assert_eq!(ref_out, dirty_out);
384 }
385}